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Abstract
We investigate a multi-market Cournot model with strategic process R&D invest-
ments wherein a multi-market monopolist meets entrants that enter one of the markets.
We find that entry can enhance the total R&D expenditure of the incumbent firm. That
is, entry can stimulate R&D effort. Moreover, the incumbent’s profit nonmonotonically
changes as the number of entrants increases. Depending on the fixed entry costs and
R&D technologies, both insufficient and excess entry can appear.
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1 Introduction
Asymmetric competition between multi-product firms and single-product firms is commonly
observed. In the retail industry, nationwide retailers (Walmart, Metro, etc.) compete with
local retailers in each region. In the airline industry, network carriers operating multiple
routes compete with regional carriers or low-cost carriers on certain routes. In the vehicle
industry, automobile (cars, buses, and trucks) producers compete with some automakers
that specialize in the production of cars. In those industries, multi-product firms can have
competitive advantages relative to their competitors because of their product multiplicities.
This is because those multi-product firms are able to apply their technologies to multiple
production lines. In addition, because those firms apply the outcomes of R&D to their
products, their returns from R&D are greater, and the multiplicities of products can generate
competitive advantages.1 Given these observations, this paper investigates how market entry
affects the multi-product firms’ process R&D and profits, as well as how social welfare is
influenced.
The basic model structure is as follows. An incumbent provides a product (call it A).
Rival firms can also produce product A. The incumbent also provides another product (call
it B). No potential entrants can supply product B. In other words, the incumbent is the
monopolist in market B. There are several possible reasons why no entrant produces product
B. For instance, product B includes advanced technologies that are available only to the
incumbent. Potential entrants do not have sufficient skills to use those advanced technologies
and/or those technologies are patented by the monopolist. Another reason is that market
B is regulated by governmental authorities. For instance, this is because the incumbent
engages in lobbying activities to protect market B.
Unlike the result that is expected in a standard Cournot model (i.e., an entry will diminish
1 The standard model of strategic R&D is formulated by Brander and Spencer (1983), and the literature
dealing with strategic R&D competition is now fairly abundant (Spence, 1984; d’Aspremont and Jacquemin,
1988; Suzumura, 1992; Lahiri and Ono, 1999; and Kitahara and Matsumura, 2006).
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the incumbent’s incentive to engage in R&D investment), we first show that entry can
enhance the total R&D expenditure of the incumbent if the level of the incumbent’s cost-
reducing technology is higher than a threshold level. Note that the threshold level can be
lower than the levels of the entrants’ cost-reducing technologies. That is, even though the
cost-reducing technology of the incumbent is inferior to that of entrants, entry can stimulate
the incumbent’s R&D. We now discuss the intuition behind the result. On the one hand,
entry in market A steals the incumbent’s quantity supplied and weakens its incentive to
engage in R&D. The existence of market B, however, allows the incumbent to maintain its
total quantity supplied because entry only occurs in market A. This high level of supply
maintains the incumbent’s incentive for cost-reducing R&D efforts. On the other hand, there
exists a strategic effect of entry in which the R&D effort reduces the entrant’s quantity, which
benefits the incumbent by raising the price. The strategic effect can dominate the decrease
in the quantity supplied in market A. As a result, the incumbent enhances its R&D efforts
following entry.
Moreover, we find that the incumbent’s profit nonmonotonically changes as the number
of entrants increases. Specifically, an additional entry increases the incumbent’s profit when
the number of existing entrants is large. As described in the first result, entry can accelerate
the R&D incentive of the incumbent. This implies that entry can be used as a credible
commitment of the incumbent to invest more. This commitment diminishes the incentives
of entrants to invest. Because the strategic effect is related to the entrants’ reactions, as the
number of entrants increases, the strategic effect mentioned above is stronger. This is why
an additional entry can increase the incumbent’s profit when the number of existing entrants
is large.
Concerning a single product market, Ishida et al. (2010) show that entry of inefficient
firms can stimulate cost-reducing R&D by the efficient incumbent firm. Moreover, entry
of inefficient firms can enhance the profit of the incumbent firm if the incumbent’s ex ante
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marginal cost is small enough.2 That is, a significant cost advantage of the incumbent is the
driving force that enhances the profit of the incumbent by entry. It is noteworthy here that
our property is quite different from that in Ishida et al. (2010). Our model assumes that
the cost-reducing technology of the incumbent in itself can be inferior to those of potential
entrants, whereas Ishida et al. (2010) assume that the incumbent has a superior ex ante
marginal cost.3 Adding our new results, we can say that the difference in ex ante marginal
costs plays an important role in inducing aggressive R&D investments by the incumbent in a
single market case; however, such a difference is not necessarily important in a multi-product
market.
Our analysis on social welfare focuses on the effect of entry. In the previous papers dealing
with the entry problem, excess entry always happens in the standard Cournot models (e.g.,
Mankiw and Whinston, 1986; Suzumura and Kiyono, 1987). Moreover, Okuno-Fujiwara and
Suzumura (1993) show that the excess entry theorem holds even when symmetric firms in
the single product market engage in cost-reducing R&D investments. The main reason is the
business-stealing effects of entry. Our paper also finds that the first entry tends to enhance
consumer welfare although it is excessive from the viewpoint of social welfare. However,
excess entry does not always hold under free entry. We show that depending on fixed entry
costs and R&D technologies, both insufficient and excess entry can appear. When the fixed
entry costs are small and the incumbent firm’s R&D technology is not so inefficient when
2 Several recent studies have discussed instances where an increase in the number of firms may actually
increase firm profit. Coughlan and Soberman (2005), Chen and Riordan (2007), and Ishibashi and Matsushima
(2009) belong to this line of research, but the underlying mechanism of our model differs substantially from
theirs. In these previous studies, market entry works as a commitment device to soften market competition,
so that the market actually becomes less competitive as it is entered by more firms. Moreover, those papers
do not include R&D investments. Using vertical relationships between upstream and downstream firms,
Tyagi (1999), Pack and Saggi (2001) and Mukherjee et al. (2009) show that entry can enhance the profits of
incumbents. Using asymmetric Stackelberg oligopoly models, Pal and Sarkar (2001) and Mukherjee and Zhao
(2009) show the possibilities of increases in existing firms’ profits by entry. In the two papers, asymmetry
among the firms is a key factor in deriving their main result, whereas the main mechanism in deriving ours
is quite different.
3 In Ishida et al. (2010), similar results can be derived even when the incumbent has a superior cost-
reducing technology given that the ex ante marginal costs of entrants and the incumbent are common.
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compared with those of entrants, market entry is insufficient from the viewpoint of social
welfare. This is because entry of new firms can enhance the incumbent’s R&D investment in
our model, while entry always diminishes R&D investment in Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura
(1993). When the incumbent’s R&D technology is efficient, this effect is strong and then its
market share becomes large. In this situation, the incumbent’s R&D should be stimulated
by entry from the viewpoint of social welfare. However, the incumbent’s stronger incentive
for R&D diminishes the profitability of each entrant and then it deters entry. Consequently,
entry is insufficient.
Several papers have already shown market structures in which insufficient entry appears
in equilibrium. Anderson and Engers (2001), Matsumura and Okamura (2006), and Gu and
Wenzel (2009) investigate equilibrium entry in spatial models a la Vickrey (1964, 1999) and
Salop (1979). Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2008) investigate a Cournot model with licensing.
Schmidt (2009) investigates vertical differentiation models. Ghosh and Morita (2007a,b) and
Mukherjee et al. (2009) take into account vertical relationship. Those papers do not consider
R&D investments in oligopoly.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 derives the outcomes of the monopoly and duopoly cases to nvestigate the effects of strategic
R&D investments by the first entry. Section 4 deals with the oligopoly case. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 Multi-product Monopolist and Entrants
A multi-product monopolist exists. It produces two products, A and B. Product A is
produced with a standard technology that is also available to potential entrants (we explain
entry of those entrants later). Product B is produced with the standard technology and an
advanced technology that is not available to potential entrants. For instance, the advanced
technology is patented by the incumbent monopolist. As a result, potential entrants cannot
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produce product B. In other words, the incumbent operates as a monopolist of product B.4
For the products, the inverse demand functions are assumed as follows:
pA = 1−QA, pB = 1−QB,
where pi is the price of product i and Qi is the total quantity of product i (i = A,B).
We now assume that there are n entrants in market A (we discuss the case in which n
is endogenously determined in Section 4). The incumbent and the n entrants are able to
engage in cost-reducing investments related to the standard technology. Assume that c is
an initial common constant marginal cost. When the incumbent (I)/an entrant (E) engages
in cost-reducing R&D, it reduces its marginal cost from c to c − ei (i = I, E) and incurs
the investment cost kie2i , where ei is the R&D effort level of i and ki is a positive constant
(i = I, E). To simplify the analysis, we assume that kI = k > kE = 1 and k > 3/2. The
assumption k > 3/2 ensures that each entrant supplies a positive quantity for any n (even
when k < 3/2, our main results hold). That is, each entrant has a more efficient cost-reducing
technology than the incumbent. For instance, entrants can concentrate their efforts toward
the cost reductions concerning the standard technology whereas the incumbent has to put
its effort toward both the standard and the advanced technologies.
The profit of the incumbent is
piI =
(
1− qAI −
n∑
i=1
qEi − (c− eI)
)
qAI + (1− qBI − (c− eI))qBI − ke2I , (1)
where qjI is the quantity supplied by the incumbent in market j (j = A,B), and qEi is the
quantity supplied by entrant i in market A (i = 1, 2, . . . , n).
The profit of entrant i is
piEi =
1− qAI − qEi −∑
j 6=i
qEj − (c− eEi)
 qEi − e2Ei. (2)
4 For expositional simplicity, we assume that only one firm supplied its products to the two markets. This
assumption is not essential to derive our main results.
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We consider two cases: (i) the incumbent is a monopolist; and (ii) entrants also produce
product A. We consider the following two-stage game. First, the firm(s) simultaneously
set(s) the effort level(s) eI and eEi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n). Second, the firm(s) simultaneously
set(s) the quantities supplied qjI (j = A,B) or qEi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n). The solution concept is
a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
3 Equilibrium: Monopoly and Duopoly
We first show the results under the cases of monopoly and duopoly. In Section 4, we show
the results under the cases of oligopoly and free entry.
3.1 Monopoly
We first solve the monopoly case to provide a comparison between the monopoly and the
duopoly cases.
Given eI , the quantities supplied by the incumbent are
qAI = qBI =
1− c+ eI
2
.
In the first stage, the incumbent determines eI . The first-order condition is
∂piI
∂eI
=
2(1− c)− 2(2k − 1)eI
2
= 0.
This leads to
eMI =
1− c
2k − 1 .
The quantities supplied and the profit are
qMAI = q
M
BI =
(1− c)k
2k − 1 , pi
M
I =
(1− c)2k
2k − 1 .
The consumer surplus and the social surplus are
CSM =
(1− c)2k2
(2k − 1)2 , SW
M =
(1− c)2k(3k − 1)
(2k − 1)2 .
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3.2 Duopoly
We solve the duopoly case. We compare this case with the monopoly case discussed above.
Given eI and eE (we omit “1” from “E1”), the quantities supplied by the incumbent and
the entrant are
qAI =
1− c+ 2eI − eE
3
, qBI =
1− c+ eI
2
, qE =
1− c+ 2eE − eI
3
.
In the first stage, the incumbent determines eI and the entrant determines eE . The
first-order conditions are
∂piI
∂eI
=
17(1− c)− (36k − 25)eI − 8eE
18
= 0,
∂piE
∂eE
=
2(2(1− c)− 5eE − 2eI)
9
= 0.
The first-order conditions lead to
eDI =
23(1− c)
60k − 47 , e
D
E =
4(6k − 7)(1− c)
60k − 47 .
The quantities supplied by the incumbent and the entrant are
qDAI =
3(1− c)(4k + 3)
60k − 47 , q
D
BI =
6(1− c)(5k − 2)
60k − 47 , q
D
E =
6(1− c)(6k − 7)
60k − 47 .
The profits of the incumbent and the entrant are
piDI =
(1− c)2(1044k2 − 1033k + 225)
(60k − 47)2 , pi
D
E =
20(1− c)2(6k − 7)2
(60k − 47)2 .
The consumer surplus and the social surplus are
SWD =
(1− c)2(6732k2 − 9314k + 3643)
2(60k − 47)2 , CS
D =
9(1− c)2(356k2 − 432k + 137)
2(60k − 47)2 .
Quantity We now briefly discuss the quantities supplied by the firms. By entry, the
quantities supplied by the incumbent are changed as follows: (i) qMAI > q
D
AI , (ii) q
M
BI ≤
qDBI iff k ≤ 12/7. The inequality (i) reflects the fact that competition reduces the quantity.
The reason why the inequality (ii) holds is that the incumbent’s R&D effort can be stimulated
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by entry. In market A, the difference between the quantities supplied by the incumbent and
the entrant is as follows: qDAI − qDE ≤ 0 iff k ≥ 17/8. If the entrant’s cost-reducing technology
is highly efficient, it produces more than the incumbent. These discussions can be applied
also to the oligopoly case in the next section.
An entry and R&D effort We now compare the R&D efforts of the incumbent in the
two cases. The difference between the R&D efforts is
eDI − eMI =
2(1− c)(12− 7k)
(2k − 1)(60k − 47) . (3)
From the equation, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The incumbent’s investment level under duopoly is larger than that under
monopoly if and only if k < 12/7.
That is, if the cost-reducing technology of the incumbent is not so inefficient, an entry
enhances the R&D incentive of the incumbent.
We now explain the mechanism behind Proposition 1. The effect of the investment on
the incumbent’s profit is written as
∂piDI
∂eI
= p′Aq
D
AI
∂qDE
∂eI︸ ︷︷ ︸
strategic-effect
+ (qDAI + q
D
BI)− I ′(eI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost-reducing effect
,
where I(·) is the investment cost of the incumbent. The cost-reducing effect is based on
the total quantity supplied by the incumbent. The total quantity decreases because of the
entry. This decrease diminishes the incentive to engage in R&D. The strategic effect consists
of two elements: one is that a reduction in the rivals’ quantities leads to an increase in the
price; the other is that the benefit from an increase in the price is proportional to its own
quantity in market A. The first element is not correlated to the value of k, but the second is
indirectly correlated to the value of k because qDAI is related to the value of k. That is, when
k is small (the cost-reducing technology of the incumbent is not so inefficient), the strategic
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effect becomes significant. To sum up, the entry enhances the strategic effect whereas it
diminishes the cost-reducing effect.
Figure 1 summarizes the explanation. On the one hand, the decrease in the cost-reducing
effect lowers the incumbent’s marginal benefit of investment. On the other hand, the strategic
effect enhances the incumbent’s marginal benefit of investment. Therefore, the marginal
benefit function under the duopoly case (MBD in the figure) is steeper than that under the
monopoly case (MBM ) because there is no strategic effect in the monopoly case. Depending
on the value of k, the entry effect on R&D is determined.
[Figure 1 here]
This property is quite different from Ishida et al. (2010) who also show the investment-
enhancing effect of entry. Our model assumes that the cost-reducing technology of the
incumbent in itself is inferior to those of potential entrants, whereas Ishida et al. (2010)
assume that the incumbent has a superior production technology.
An entry and welfare The entry tends to enhance consumer welfare although it is
excessive from the viewpoint of social welfare (see Figure 2). The increment in consumer
(social) welfare is larger (smaller) than the profit of the entrant. This is because the entry can
increase the incentives of R&D investments and decreases the market price of product A. The
duplication of the R&D investments is wasteful from the viewpoint of social welfare. This is
significant when k is small (the incumbent’s marginal investment cost is small). This logic,
however, does not always hold when the number of entrants is endogenously determined.
[Figure 2 here]
4 Equilibrium: Oligopoly and Free Entry
We first consider an entry in the case where n entrants exist in market A. Next, we investigate
welfare under free entry in market A.
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Given eI and eEi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), the quantities supplied by the incumbent and the
entrants are
qAI =
1− c+ (n+ 1)eI −
∑n
i=1 eEi
n+ 2
, qBI =
1− c+ eI
2
,
qEi =
1− c+ (n+ 1)eEi − eI −
∑
j 6=i eEj
n+ 2
.
In the first stage, the incumbent determines eI and each entrant determines eEi (i =
1, 2, . . . , n). The first-order conditions are
∂piI
∂eI
=
(1− c)(n2 + 8n+ 8)− (4(n+ 2)2k − (5n2 + 12n+ 8))eI − 4(n+ 1)
∑n
i=1 eEi
2(n+ 2)2
= 0,
∂piEi
∂eEi
=
2((1− c)(n+ 1)− (2n+ 3)eEi − (n+ 1)eI − (n+ 1)
∑
j 6=i eEj)
(n+ 2)2
= 0.
The first-order conditions lead to
eOI =
(1− c)(n3 + 4n2 + 10n+ 8)
4(n+ 2)(n2 + 2n+ 2)k − (5n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8) ,
eOEi =
2(1− c)(n+ 1)(2(n+ 2)k − (3n+ 4))
4(n+ 2)(n2 + 2n+ 2)k − (5n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8) .
The quantities supplied by the incumbent and the entrants are
qOAI =
(1− c)(n+ 2)(4k + n(n+ 2))
4(n+ 2)(n2 + 2n+ 2)k − (5n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8) ,
qOBI =
2(1− c)(n+ 2)((n2 + 2n+ 2)k − n(n+ 1))
4(n+ 2)(n2 + 2n+ 2)k − (5n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8) ,
qOEi =
2(1− c)(n+ 2)(2(n+ 2)k − (3n+ 4))
4(n+ 2)(n2 + 2n+ 2)k − (5n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8) .
The profits of the incumbent and the entrants are
piOI =
(1− c)2(n+ 2)2(4k + n(n+ 2))2
(4(n+ 2)(n2 + 2n+ 2)k − (5n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8))2
+
4(1− c)2(n+ 2)2((n2 + 2n+ 2)k − n(n+ 1))2
(4(n+ 2)(n2 + 2n+ 2)k − (5n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8))2
− (1− c)k(n
3 + 4n2 + 10n+ 8)2
(4(n+ 2)(n2 + 2n+ 2)k − (5n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8))2 ,
piOEi =
4(1− c)2(2n+ 3)(2(n+ 2)k − (3n+ 4))2
(4(n+ 2)(n2 + 2n+ 2)k − (5n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8))2 .
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The social surplus and consumer surplus are
CSO =
(1− c)2(n+ 2)2(4(n+ 1)2k − (5n+ 6)n)2
2(4(n+ 2)(n2 + 2n+ 2)k − (5n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8))2
+
2(1− c)2(n+ 2)2((n2 + 2n+ 2)k − (n+ 1)n)2
(4(n+ 2)(n2 + 2n+ 2)k − (5n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8))2 ,
SWO = CSO + piOI + npi
O
Ei.
An entry and R&D effort As explained in the previous section, an increase in n can
stimulate the R&D efforts of the incumbent. The partial derivative of eOI with respect to n
is
∂eOI
∂n
=
4(1− c)[(n4 + 16n3 + 46n2 + 48n+ 16)− 4(2n3 + 7n2 + 8n+ 2)k]
(4(n+ 2)(n2 + 2n+ 2)k − (5n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8))2 . (4)
From the equation, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The incumbent’s investment level is increasing in n if and only if
k <
n4 + 16n3 + 46n2 + 48n+ 16
4(2n3 + 7n2 + 8n+ 2)
.
This is summarized in Figure 3. For any n ≥ 1, the right-hand side is increasing in n. When
n = 1, this is 127/76 ' 1.671.5 The reason why the inequality holds is similar to that in the
previous section.
[Figure 3 here]
Entry and the profit of the incumbent The partial derivative of the incumbent’s
profit is
∂piOI
∂n
=− 16(1− c)
2(n+ 1)(4k + n(n+ 2))
(4(n+ 2)(n2 + 2n+ 2)k − (5n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8))3 (5)
× [(n+ 1)(7n2 + 20n+ 16)− (48 + 90n+ 54n2 + 11n3)k + 4(n+ 2)3k2].
From the equation, we have the following proposition.
5 Note that the upper bound of k is different from that in the duopoly case. In this subsection, we use
differentiation to derive the upper bound whereas in the previous subsection we use the difference between
the duopoly and the monopoly cases. The methodological difference leads to slightly different results.
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Proposition 3 The incumbent’s profit is increasing in n if and only if
k <
11n3 + 54n2 + 90n+ 48
8(n+ 2)3
(6)
+
√
9n6 + 84n5 + 384n4 + 984n3 + 1380n2 + 960n+ 256
8(n+ 2)3
.
This is summarized in Figure 4. When n is large and k is small, an additional entry can
increase the profit of the incumbent. As explained before, when k is small, an increase in
the number of entrants accelerates the R&D incentive of the incumbent. An entry can be
a credible commitment of the incumbent to invest more. This commitment diminishes the
incentives of entrants to invest. As a result, an additional entry can increase the incumbent’s
profit.
[Figure 4 here]
Entry and welfare In this model, we can make examples of both excess and insufficient
entry. When k is small, whether or not entry is excessive depends on the fixed entry costs.
We can also show that when k is large, excess entry appears.
In Figure 5, we depict three curves. The curve piE = F indicates the equilibrium number
of entrants given k. This curve shows that the equilibrium number of entrants increases
with the increase in k. The curve ∂SWO/∂n = F indicates a necessary condition that social
welfare is maximized. The curve SWM = SWO−nF indicates that social welfare under the
monopoly case is equal to that under the n-firm oligopoly case. The upper (lower) region
of SWM = SWO − nF indicates that SWM > SWO − nF (SWM < SWO − nF ). If
∂SWO/∂n = F is on the lower region of SWM = SWO − nF , the social optimal number of
entrants is indicated by the thick curve on ∂SWO/∂n = F ; otherwise, the optimal number
is zero (monopoly is the best). For instance, we now suppose that k is smaller than 1.57.
The social optimum number of entrants is more than 30 although the equilibrium number
of entrants is less than 10. This is an example of insufficient entry. We now suppose that k
is larger than 1.6. The social optimum number of entrants is zero although the equilibrium
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number is larger than five. This is an example of excess entry. This property is summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 When k is small enough, the equilibrium number of firms is excessive from
the viewpoint of social welfare.
[Figure 5 here]
We now discuss the intuition behind the tendency. As in the standard Cournot models,
the business-stealing effect leads to excess entry (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986; Suzumura
and Kiyono, 1987; and Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura, 1993). In our model, additional
effects exist. When k is small (the cost-reducing technology of the incumbent is not so
inefficient), entry enhances the investment of the incumbent (Proposition 2). This has two
effects: one is positive, the other is negative. The positive effect is that the improvement
of production efficiency enhances competition. The negative effect is the duplication of the
R&D investments undertaken by the firms. When k is large, the negative effect is significant
because the incumbent’s R&D technology is inefficient. On the other hand, the incumbent’s
stronger R&D incentive caused by entry diminishes the incentives of potential entrants to
enter the market. That is, this strong incentive of the incumbent can deter beneficial entry.
When k is small enough, this entry deterrence effect dominates the standard business-stealing
effect.
In Figure 6, we change the level of the entry cost F . The left-hand (right-hand) figure
shows a case in which F is large (small). As the value of F decreases, the range of k, which
leads to insufficient entry, increases.
[Figure 6 here]
When F is small, the socially optimal number of entrants is large. As mentioned earlier, a
large number of entrants tends to deter beneficial entry because the large number enhances
the incumbent’s R&D investment. Therefore, when F is small enough, the equilibrium
number of entrants tends to be insufficient.
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5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has considered a multi-market model wherein an incumbent meets entrants in
one market while it is a monopolist in the other market, and investigates how the market
entry affects the incumbent’s R&D, its profits, and social welfare. We show that entry can
enhance the total R&D expenditure of the incumbent. We also show that an additional entry
can increase the incumbent’s profit when the number of existing entrants is large. Further-
more, our analysis of social welfare shows that depending on the fixed entry costs and R&D
technologies, both insufficient and excess entry can appear in equilibrium. These findings
not only provide useful implications for firms’ strategic behaviors on R&D investments, but
also offer meaningful implications for entry regulators with welfare concerns.
Our model is a standard Cournot type with multiple markets, and has been constructed
based on some observations in which some leading firms with advanced technologies attempt
to provide other new products (i.e., those firms can enter into new markets) by fully exploiting
their standard and advanced technologies. Those leading firms also tend to encourage minor
firms to enter the market of products with standard technologies. Therefore, the market
structure of our model is applicable to various practical situations.
There remain some limitations of the model, which should be addressed in the future.
First, the two products discussed here are independent of each other on the demand side. It
is natural to consider the consumption relationship between the two products. For example,
Dawid et al. (2010) consider that a firm can provide a new product that is horizontally
and vertically differentiated from the current product by product innovation projects. The
consumption relationships might influence the effects of process R&D competition. This topic
can be considered in future research. Second, we can incorporate licensing into our model.
For instance, the incumbent firm can allow other firms to enter the monopolized market
subject to the acceptance of licensing contracts. In this setting, it is not obvious whether or
not the incumbent licenses its technology because new entry caused by the license alter the
incentives of the entrants to engage in R&D. This can also be addressed in future research.
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Figure 1: Marginal benefit and marginal cost of investment
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Figure 2: piE, ∆SW , and ∆CS (the duopoly case)
Note: piE , ∆SW , and ∆CS are divided by (1− c)2 without loss of generality.
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Figure 4: Entries and the incumbent’s profit
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(Left: F/(1− c)2 = 1/500, Right: F/(1− c)2 = 1/2500)
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